bitchgirl
University Life
modern history essay draft, i need help on introduction and conclusion, what should i say for my essay intro and conclusion, because these are the tricky things i get mixed up with and usually my marks get down by putting wrong things in my intro and conclusion...
any suggestions or help with it?
--------------------------------------------------
here's my draft essay, i've tried to post as an attachment but it failed
---------------------
draft
To what extent did Japanese militarism cause the outbreak of
war with the United States in 1941?
The United States entered the War on December 7, 1941, the day that the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. By the end of the War, more people were killed, more property destroyed, more people's lives were disrupted, and probably more far-reaching consequences were caused than any other war in history. World War II brought about the downfall of Western Europe as the center of world power, led to the rise of the Soviet Union, set up conditions leading to the Cold War, and opened the nuclear age.
The Japanese knew that they could not continue to fight their war in china without the vital resources that were now being denied them by the Allied embargo implemented in June 1941. Therefore, they were faced with either losing face by withdrawing from China or finding resources they needed to continue the war, as Japan had no natural resources that could be used for industry. To strike sussessfully, the Japanese knew they would have to remove the only viable threat and that was the Americans at Pearl Harbor. So for the Americans to delay its entry into the Pacific war for 2 years. Emperor Hirohito was the Ulitimate symbol of Japanese militarism in the outbreak of war between Japan and The United States.
In the period between the two world wars, Japan sought to establish control first of east Asia and then of the southwest Pacific. After a decade of liberal ascendancy and acquiescence in the post World War I agreements, the extremists in Japan gained power and embarked on a program of military preparation and territorial aggrandizement. First the Japanese moved into Manchuria and then into China, where they soon became involved in a war that dragged on interminably and from which they could extract neither victory nor honor. Having scrapped the Washington Treaty system, they withdrew from the League of Nations and from the naval disarmament system established in 1922 and 1930. Gradually they moved toward a closer understanding with Germany and Italy, and, in 1940, turned south to the rich British, French, and Dutch colonies of southeast Asia in search of raw materials they needed to carry on the war in China. Which cause tension with the United States and Japan and lead them into war with eachother. The United States opposed all these moves as vigorously as circumstances permitted. Since the turn of the century, when it had annexed the Philippines, the United States had been inextricably drawn into the confused politics and imperialist rivalries of the Far East. Despite the nation's traditional preference for remaining aloof from world affairs, it was abundantly clear that America could not remain indifferent to any change in the status quo in the Pacific or in Asia.In China remained the keystone of American policy in the years that followed. It was inevitable, therefore, that the United States would challenge the efforts of any power to gain a dominant position on the mainland of Asia. America's opposition to Japanese expansion in Asia, its insistence on the open-door policy and the integrity of China, led to mutual distrust and suspicion. No Japanese government could accept America's solution for the deepening crisis and remain in power; nor would the United States accede under any conditions to the dismemberment of China. There was no escape from this dilemma and by mid-1941, despite the utmost efforts of men of good will on both sides of the Pacific, Japan was moving rapidly down the road that led to Pearl Harbor.
It is clear that Japan did not interpret the Tripartite Pact as a commitment to war, and as a matter of fact, the Emperor agreed to it with misgivings and only after he had been assured that it would not lead to hostilities. The Konoye Cabinet evidently believed that the United States and the Soviet Union would not intervene in the Far East if the advance southward was achieved gradually and by diplomatic means. They hoped that the United States would be forced by the Tripartite Pact to remain neutral and that the issue would be between Japan and the British, Dutch, and French who were in no position to dispute Japanese expansion southward. Soviet opposition was to be overcome through the intervention of Germany. These hopes were entirely unrealistic. The United States had never retreated from its position on China and had declined time and again to recognize Japan's interpretation of treaties to which the United States was a party. Instead of showing any timidity or weakness, the United States Government on this occasion adopted a firm but cautious attitude. Cordell Hull announced to newsmen that the pact did not substantially alter the situation, but his statement was belied by the announcement on 8 October 1940 that consuls in the Far East had been instructed to advise American citizens to return home, and that three liners had been sent to the Orient to hasten their evacuation. Already the Pacific Fleet, which was normally based on the west coast, had been ordered to remain at Pearl Harbor indefinitely, and preparations were being made to strengthen American garrisons in Alaska, Hawaii, and Panama. While maintaining a firm attitude toward Japan, the United States Government adopted a policy designed to avoid an open struggle in the Pacific so that American resources would not be diverted from the main tasks strengthening the nation's military forces and aiding Britain. Japan, it was agreed, was not to be pushed to the point where her military elements would demand war The door was to be left open for discussion and agreement, but the United States was to maintain its treaty rights in the Far East, continue to exert economic pressure against Japan, and provide aid to China. The Tripartite Pact, in the view of the United States, had placed Japan in the Axis camp and Japan was to be treated as one of the Axis Powers. The last chance of settling Japanese-American conflicts as a separate problem, divorced from European affairs, was gone. In his Fireside Chat of 29 December 1940, President Roosevelt emphasized that the Tripartite Pact represented a threat to the United States and that the nation for its own defense must increase its aid to the free nations and make greater efforts to rearm. In spite of the fact that the Tripartite Pact had failed to convince the United States that acceptance of Japan's program for expansion was desirable, the Konoye Cabinet continued along the path laid out by the Liaison Conference of 27 July. Every effort was made to bring the war in China to an end, when air bombardment failed, the Japanese solicited the support of German diplomacy. The only result of these measures was another American loan to Chiang Kai-shek, this time for a hundred million dollars. Japanese policy was no more successful in the Indies. The conversations begun in September dragged on, with a new special envoy taking Kobayashi's place in January 1941. The Dutch so stoutly resisted Japanese pressure for economic co-operation that the new envoy reported that force alone would produce the desired results. But Japan was not yet ready for war and rather than lose prestige by breaking off the negotiations Konoye instructed the delegates to remain in Batavia.
By this time Japan was feeling the pinch of shortages created by the controls the United States had instituted over shipments to Japan, and the relations between the two countries had improved not at all. Efforts to settle the outstanding disagreements between them had begun in February, when Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura arrived in the United States. After a series of preliminary talks with President Roosevelt and Mr. Hull, Nomura, on 18 April, handed the Americans a 7-point proposal as the basis for an agreement. Essentially, this proposal called for the United States to provide, or assist Japan in securing, strategic raw materials, and to persuade Chiang to reach agreement with Japan. In return, Japan would agree not to start war in the southwest Pacific and to interpret the Tripartite Pact as meaning Japan would support Germany only if that nation were the object of aggression. The proposal was not acceptable to the Americans and was made even less so by revisions from Tokyo. On 30 May, Mr. Hull presented an interim American proposal to Nomura and on 21 June a second draft, to which was attached a "verbal memo" containing a delicate reference to the lack of confidence the Americans had in the pro-Axis Japanese Foreign Minister, Mr. Matsuoka. The negotiations had reached a deadlock and the only hopeful sign was the trouble brewing within the Japanese Cabinet where a change might produce a shift in the direction of Japanese policy. For almost six months the planners of the Joint Board considered the problem presented by simultaneous Axis aggression in the Atlantic and Pacific areas and finally in April 1939 submitted their report. In it they reviewed the world situation, estimated the likelihood of war, calculated the probable objectives of the Axis in Europe and Japan in the Far East, discussed the effects of concerted action by these powers on the United States, and analyzed the strategic problems involved in the various situations that might result from such action. So comprehensive was the report, such a model of strategic analysis, that it was characterized by the Joint Board as a monument to its planning committee and became the basis for much of the strategic planning before Pearl Harbor.
In their effort to arrive at a sound military strategy for the United States, the joint planners examined the various contingencies that might arise as a result of Axis aggression. Based on this examination, they concluded:
1. Germany and Italy would take overt action in the Western Hemisphere only if Great Britain and France remained neutral or were defeated.
2. Japan would continue to expand into China and Southeast Asia at the expense of Great Britain and the United States, by peaceful means if possible but by force if necessary.
3. The three Axis Powers would act together whenever the international situation seemed favorable. If other countries, including the United States, reacted promptly and vigorously to such action then a general war might well follow.
The reaction of the United States to these or any other situations that might arise, the planners pointed out, would depend in large measure on the forces available and the extent to which American interests were involved. In the event of a threat in both oceans simultaneously, the United States, they maintained, should assume the defensive in the Pacific, retaining adequate forces based on Hawaii to guard the strategic triangle. Arguing further in a manner reminiscent of planning, the strategists of the Joint Board declared that priority in a two-ocean war must go first to the defense of vital positions in the Western Hemisphere the Panama Canal and the Caribbean area. From bases in that region, the U.S. Fleet could operate in either ocean as the situation demanded, but its primary obligation must always be to control the Atlantic approaches to the Western Hemisphere, especially to the south where the continent was most exposed. This task would not be difficult if Great Britain and France actively opposed Axis aggression, but if they did not the security of the South Atlantic would become the major concern of U.S. forces.
In their studies the planners also considered the possibility of a war with Japan alone. The United States would have to expect to lose all its possessions west of 180 degrees early in such a war, which, the planners prophetically pointed out, might well begin with a Japanese effort "to damage major fleet units without warning," or a surprise attempt "to block the fleet in Pearl Harbor." It would be necessary, then, for American forces to fight their way back across the Pacific in a series of amphibious operations using one of four routes: (1) the Aleutians; (2) Pearl Harbor-Midway-Luzon; (3) the Marshalls-Carolines-Marianas-Yap-Peleliu; and (4) Samoa-New Guinea-Mindanao. The planners favored the second and third routes and thought that a combination of the two would have to be used. The garrisons in Hawaii, Alaska, and Panama were to be reinforced, but not the Philippines, apparently on the assumption that their loss was certain. The planners were astute enough to recognize, however, that emotionalized opinion rather than a reasoned adjustment of operations to the means at hand might ultimately dictate the choice of battleground.
American military forces in 1939 seemed sufficiently strong to accomplish the minimum tasks required under the strategic concept proposed by the planners -- defense of U.S. vital interests in the Western Hemisphere and in the Atlantic area. After hostilities began, American forces could be strengthened sufficiently to defeat the enemy operating in the Atlantic, even without the aid of Great Britain and France. If, at the same time, the United States maintained adequate defensive forces in the Pacific, Japan could probably be restricted to the western Pacific. It was even possible, in such a situation, that the Japanese leaders might prefer peace with the United States, hoping thereby to reap a profit from the war without cost to themselves. If, on the other hand, Japan initiated hostilities and the United States adopted a position of readiness but refrained from an advance to the western Pacific, the European Axis would probably not undertake any aggressive adventures in the Western Hemisphere. Thus, on all accounts, the planners held that a defensive strategy in the Pacific was preferable to any other course. The summer of 1941 was a crucial one for both Japan and the United States. Over a period of several years American planners had devised a strategy designed to protect the Western Hemisphere against Axis aggression and, if the United States was forced into war, to throw the bulk of its resources against Germany. But this strategy assumed, first, that Japan could be deterred from aggression by means short of war, and second, that in the event hostilities in the Far East could not be avoided, the United States would accept the loss of American territory in that area. The planners, unwilling to face the unpleasant prospect of large-scale military operations in the western Pacific, accepted these assumptions. But there were many, including the President and his Secretary of War, who found the conclusions of military logic distasteful and sought a way out of the dilemma. The solution provided by the advocates of air power turned American eyes once more to the Far East. The crisis facing the Japanese leaders was more serious. In their view the very existence of the nation depended on their decisions. There seemed to be no way to end the war in China and economic restrictions were crippling their efforts to stockpile strategic materials and prepare the nation for any eventuality. Japan was truly at the crossroad. By mid-August 1941, American military strategy for the Pacific and Far East which reflected the determination to avoid war with Japan and to remain on the defensive even if it meant the loss of the Philippines, Guam, and Wake -- no longer reflected the policy of the U.S. Government. There had been signs even before that was completed that American policy toward Japan was stiffening. The President's action in May making China eligible for lend-lease had marked the beginning of a shift in Far Eastern policy. Though it proved difficult to find any munitions to furnish China because early plans for lend-lease had been made entirely in terms of aid to Britain, by July the principle of arming a compact Chinese Army and Air Force with American weapons had been accepted with all the implications this had for relations with the Japanese. In addition, a mission under Brig. Gen. John Magruder was dispatched to China to aid in delivery of materials over the Burma Road and to assist the Chinese both in using the materials received and in placing orders properly. Magruder did not, however, have authority to discuss military plans with the Chinese, nor was he told what he should do if war broke out between the United States and Japan.
The order of freezing Japanese assets in the United States and establishing a oil embargo gave further confirmation of America's stiffening policy toward Japan. The planners had objected to the move on the ground that it might force Japan into war to gain the oil it so badly needed and thus imperil American interests in the Atlantic. The President believed too, as he had written Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes earlier in the month, that "it is terribly important for the control of the Atlantic for us to help to keep peace in the Pacific," but felt, after the German attack on the Soviet Union had in effect lessened the immediate danger in the Atlantic and freed Japan to move south, that the United States could take a stronger stand in the Pacific. This conviction, shared by Stimson and others was a basic factor in the decisions made during the months before Pearl Harbor. By the end of August the Navy staff had worked out plans for seizing bases in the western Pacific, and had from Admiral Yamamoto a separate plan for an attack on Pearl Harbor. Table-top maneuvers at Tokyo Naval War College between 10-13 September resulted in agreement on operations for the seizure of the Philippines, Malaya, the Netherlands Indies, Burma, and islands in the South Pacific. But there was still some doubt about Yamamoto's plan. The exercise had demonstrated that a Pearl Harbor strike was practicable, but many felt that it was too risky, that the U.S. Pacific Fleet might not be in port on the day of the attack, and that the danger of discovery during the long voyage to Hawaii was too great. But Admiral Yamamoto refused to give up his plan and finally, when he failed to convert his colleagues, offered to resign from the Navy. The combination of his strong argument that the success of the southward drive depended on the destruction of the American fleet, his enormous prestige, and his threat to resign were too much for opponents of the plan. In mid-October, a month after the maneuvers, the Navy General Staff finally adopted his concept of a surprise carrier-based attack on Pearl Harbor and incorporated it into the larger plan for war.
By the fall of 1941 relations between the United States and Japan had reached a critical stage. American leaders had made it clear that so long as Japan adhered to the Tripartite Pact and to its efforts to conquer China there was little chance for compromise. But they needed time to complete their preparations.
For the Japanese, most of whom were unwilling to pay the American price for peace, time was of the essence. They were convinced that acceptance of American peace terms would only lead to further demands and ultimately leave Japan dependent on the United States and Great Britain. To them the gambles of war seemed preferable to the ignominy of a disgraceful peace. On 7th December 1941 the Japanese attacked the American Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor in the hope of knocking the United States out of a Pacific war. By doing so the Japanese hoped to be able to persue their strategic and imperialistic goals in the south. Japan's failure to achieve total victory meant that the japanese unified an isolationist nation against them, which then mobilised its mighty economy into a war machine that eventually defeated Japan.
any suggestions or help with it?
--------------------------------------------------
here's my draft essay, i've tried to post as an attachment but it failed
---------------------
draft
To what extent did Japanese militarism cause the outbreak of
war with the United States in 1941?
The United States entered the War on December 7, 1941, the day that the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. By the end of the War, more people were killed, more property destroyed, more people's lives were disrupted, and probably more far-reaching consequences were caused than any other war in history. World War II brought about the downfall of Western Europe as the center of world power, led to the rise of the Soviet Union, set up conditions leading to the Cold War, and opened the nuclear age.
The Japanese knew that they could not continue to fight their war in china without the vital resources that were now being denied them by the Allied embargo implemented in June 1941. Therefore, they were faced with either losing face by withdrawing from China or finding resources they needed to continue the war, as Japan had no natural resources that could be used for industry. To strike sussessfully, the Japanese knew they would have to remove the only viable threat and that was the Americans at Pearl Harbor. So for the Americans to delay its entry into the Pacific war for 2 years. Emperor Hirohito was the Ulitimate symbol of Japanese militarism in the outbreak of war between Japan and The United States.
In the period between the two world wars, Japan sought to establish control first of east Asia and then of the southwest Pacific. After a decade of liberal ascendancy and acquiescence in the post World War I agreements, the extremists in Japan gained power and embarked on a program of military preparation and territorial aggrandizement. First the Japanese moved into Manchuria and then into China, where they soon became involved in a war that dragged on interminably and from which they could extract neither victory nor honor. Having scrapped the Washington Treaty system, they withdrew from the League of Nations and from the naval disarmament system established in 1922 and 1930. Gradually they moved toward a closer understanding with Germany and Italy, and, in 1940, turned south to the rich British, French, and Dutch colonies of southeast Asia in search of raw materials they needed to carry on the war in China. Which cause tension with the United States and Japan and lead them into war with eachother. The United States opposed all these moves as vigorously as circumstances permitted. Since the turn of the century, when it had annexed the Philippines, the United States had been inextricably drawn into the confused politics and imperialist rivalries of the Far East. Despite the nation's traditional preference for remaining aloof from world affairs, it was abundantly clear that America could not remain indifferent to any change in the status quo in the Pacific or in Asia.In China remained the keystone of American policy in the years that followed. It was inevitable, therefore, that the United States would challenge the efforts of any power to gain a dominant position on the mainland of Asia. America's opposition to Japanese expansion in Asia, its insistence on the open-door policy and the integrity of China, led to mutual distrust and suspicion. No Japanese government could accept America's solution for the deepening crisis and remain in power; nor would the United States accede under any conditions to the dismemberment of China. There was no escape from this dilemma and by mid-1941, despite the utmost efforts of men of good will on both sides of the Pacific, Japan was moving rapidly down the road that led to Pearl Harbor.
It is clear that Japan did not interpret the Tripartite Pact as a commitment to war, and as a matter of fact, the Emperor agreed to it with misgivings and only after he had been assured that it would not lead to hostilities. The Konoye Cabinet evidently believed that the United States and the Soviet Union would not intervene in the Far East if the advance southward was achieved gradually and by diplomatic means. They hoped that the United States would be forced by the Tripartite Pact to remain neutral and that the issue would be between Japan and the British, Dutch, and French who were in no position to dispute Japanese expansion southward. Soviet opposition was to be overcome through the intervention of Germany. These hopes were entirely unrealistic. The United States had never retreated from its position on China and had declined time and again to recognize Japan's interpretation of treaties to which the United States was a party. Instead of showing any timidity or weakness, the United States Government on this occasion adopted a firm but cautious attitude. Cordell Hull announced to newsmen that the pact did not substantially alter the situation, but his statement was belied by the announcement on 8 October 1940 that consuls in the Far East had been instructed to advise American citizens to return home, and that three liners had been sent to the Orient to hasten their evacuation. Already the Pacific Fleet, which was normally based on the west coast, had been ordered to remain at Pearl Harbor indefinitely, and preparations were being made to strengthen American garrisons in Alaska, Hawaii, and Panama. While maintaining a firm attitude toward Japan, the United States Government adopted a policy designed to avoid an open struggle in the Pacific so that American resources would not be diverted from the main tasks strengthening the nation's military forces and aiding Britain. Japan, it was agreed, was not to be pushed to the point where her military elements would demand war The door was to be left open for discussion and agreement, but the United States was to maintain its treaty rights in the Far East, continue to exert economic pressure against Japan, and provide aid to China. The Tripartite Pact, in the view of the United States, had placed Japan in the Axis camp and Japan was to be treated as one of the Axis Powers. The last chance of settling Japanese-American conflicts as a separate problem, divorced from European affairs, was gone. In his Fireside Chat of 29 December 1940, President Roosevelt emphasized that the Tripartite Pact represented a threat to the United States and that the nation for its own defense must increase its aid to the free nations and make greater efforts to rearm. In spite of the fact that the Tripartite Pact had failed to convince the United States that acceptance of Japan's program for expansion was desirable, the Konoye Cabinet continued along the path laid out by the Liaison Conference of 27 July. Every effort was made to bring the war in China to an end, when air bombardment failed, the Japanese solicited the support of German diplomacy. The only result of these measures was another American loan to Chiang Kai-shek, this time for a hundred million dollars. Japanese policy was no more successful in the Indies. The conversations begun in September dragged on, with a new special envoy taking Kobayashi's place in January 1941. The Dutch so stoutly resisted Japanese pressure for economic co-operation that the new envoy reported that force alone would produce the desired results. But Japan was not yet ready for war and rather than lose prestige by breaking off the negotiations Konoye instructed the delegates to remain in Batavia.
By this time Japan was feeling the pinch of shortages created by the controls the United States had instituted over shipments to Japan, and the relations between the two countries had improved not at all. Efforts to settle the outstanding disagreements between them had begun in February, when Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura arrived in the United States. After a series of preliminary talks with President Roosevelt and Mr. Hull, Nomura, on 18 April, handed the Americans a 7-point proposal as the basis for an agreement. Essentially, this proposal called for the United States to provide, or assist Japan in securing, strategic raw materials, and to persuade Chiang to reach agreement with Japan. In return, Japan would agree not to start war in the southwest Pacific and to interpret the Tripartite Pact as meaning Japan would support Germany only if that nation were the object of aggression. The proposal was not acceptable to the Americans and was made even less so by revisions from Tokyo. On 30 May, Mr. Hull presented an interim American proposal to Nomura and on 21 June a second draft, to which was attached a "verbal memo" containing a delicate reference to the lack of confidence the Americans had in the pro-Axis Japanese Foreign Minister, Mr. Matsuoka. The negotiations had reached a deadlock and the only hopeful sign was the trouble brewing within the Japanese Cabinet where a change might produce a shift in the direction of Japanese policy. For almost six months the planners of the Joint Board considered the problem presented by simultaneous Axis aggression in the Atlantic and Pacific areas and finally in April 1939 submitted their report. In it they reviewed the world situation, estimated the likelihood of war, calculated the probable objectives of the Axis in Europe and Japan in the Far East, discussed the effects of concerted action by these powers on the United States, and analyzed the strategic problems involved in the various situations that might result from such action. So comprehensive was the report, such a model of strategic analysis, that it was characterized by the Joint Board as a monument to its planning committee and became the basis for much of the strategic planning before Pearl Harbor.
In their effort to arrive at a sound military strategy for the United States, the joint planners examined the various contingencies that might arise as a result of Axis aggression. Based on this examination, they concluded:
1. Germany and Italy would take overt action in the Western Hemisphere only if Great Britain and France remained neutral or were defeated.
2. Japan would continue to expand into China and Southeast Asia at the expense of Great Britain and the United States, by peaceful means if possible but by force if necessary.
3. The three Axis Powers would act together whenever the international situation seemed favorable. If other countries, including the United States, reacted promptly and vigorously to such action then a general war might well follow.
The reaction of the United States to these or any other situations that might arise, the planners pointed out, would depend in large measure on the forces available and the extent to which American interests were involved. In the event of a threat in both oceans simultaneously, the United States, they maintained, should assume the defensive in the Pacific, retaining adequate forces based on Hawaii to guard the strategic triangle. Arguing further in a manner reminiscent of planning, the strategists of the Joint Board declared that priority in a two-ocean war must go first to the defense of vital positions in the Western Hemisphere the Panama Canal and the Caribbean area. From bases in that region, the U.S. Fleet could operate in either ocean as the situation demanded, but its primary obligation must always be to control the Atlantic approaches to the Western Hemisphere, especially to the south where the continent was most exposed. This task would not be difficult if Great Britain and France actively opposed Axis aggression, but if they did not the security of the South Atlantic would become the major concern of U.S. forces.
In their studies the planners also considered the possibility of a war with Japan alone. The United States would have to expect to lose all its possessions west of 180 degrees early in such a war, which, the planners prophetically pointed out, might well begin with a Japanese effort "to damage major fleet units without warning," or a surprise attempt "to block the fleet in Pearl Harbor." It would be necessary, then, for American forces to fight their way back across the Pacific in a series of amphibious operations using one of four routes: (1) the Aleutians; (2) Pearl Harbor-Midway-Luzon; (3) the Marshalls-Carolines-Marianas-Yap-Peleliu; and (4) Samoa-New Guinea-Mindanao. The planners favored the second and third routes and thought that a combination of the two would have to be used. The garrisons in Hawaii, Alaska, and Panama were to be reinforced, but not the Philippines, apparently on the assumption that their loss was certain. The planners were astute enough to recognize, however, that emotionalized opinion rather than a reasoned adjustment of operations to the means at hand might ultimately dictate the choice of battleground.
American military forces in 1939 seemed sufficiently strong to accomplish the minimum tasks required under the strategic concept proposed by the planners -- defense of U.S. vital interests in the Western Hemisphere and in the Atlantic area. After hostilities began, American forces could be strengthened sufficiently to defeat the enemy operating in the Atlantic, even without the aid of Great Britain and France. If, at the same time, the United States maintained adequate defensive forces in the Pacific, Japan could probably be restricted to the western Pacific. It was even possible, in such a situation, that the Japanese leaders might prefer peace with the United States, hoping thereby to reap a profit from the war without cost to themselves. If, on the other hand, Japan initiated hostilities and the United States adopted a position of readiness but refrained from an advance to the western Pacific, the European Axis would probably not undertake any aggressive adventures in the Western Hemisphere. Thus, on all accounts, the planners held that a defensive strategy in the Pacific was preferable to any other course. The summer of 1941 was a crucial one for both Japan and the United States. Over a period of several years American planners had devised a strategy designed to protect the Western Hemisphere against Axis aggression and, if the United States was forced into war, to throw the bulk of its resources against Germany. But this strategy assumed, first, that Japan could be deterred from aggression by means short of war, and second, that in the event hostilities in the Far East could not be avoided, the United States would accept the loss of American territory in that area. The planners, unwilling to face the unpleasant prospect of large-scale military operations in the western Pacific, accepted these assumptions. But there were many, including the President and his Secretary of War, who found the conclusions of military logic distasteful and sought a way out of the dilemma. The solution provided by the advocates of air power turned American eyes once more to the Far East. The crisis facing the Japanese leaders was more serious. In their view the very existence of the nation depended on their decisions. There seemed to be no way to end the war in China and economic restrictions were crippling their efforts to stockpile strategic materials and prepare the nation for any eventuality. Japan was truly at the crossroad. By mid-August 1941, American military strategy for the Pacific and Far East which reflected the determination to avoid war with Japan and to remain on the defensive even if it meant the loss of the Philippines, Guam, and Wake -- no longer reflected the policy of the U.S. Government. There had been signs even before that was completed that American policy toward Japan was stiffening. The President's action in May making China eligible for lend-lease had marked the beginning of a shift in Far Eastern policy. Though it proved difficult to find any munitions to furnish China because early plans for lend-lease had been made entirely in terms of aid to Britain, by July the principle of arming a compact Chinese Army and Air Force with American weapons had been accepted with all the implications this had for relations with the Japanese. In addition, a mission under Brig. Gen. John Magruder was dispatched to China to aid in delivery of materials over the Burma Road and to assist the Chinese both in using the materials received and in placing orders properly. Magruder did not, however, have authority to discuss military plans with the Chinese, nor was he told what he should do if war broke out between the United States and Japan.
The order of freezing Japanese assets in the United States and establishing a oil embargo gave further confirmation of America's stiffening policy toward Japan. The planners had objected to the move on the ground that it might force Japan into war to gain the oil it so badly needed and thus imperil American interests in the Atlantic. The President believed too, as he had written Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes earlier in the month, that "it is terribly important for the control of the Atlantic for us to help to keep peace in the Pacific," but felt, after the German attack on the Soviet Union had in effect lessened the immediate danger in the Atlantic and freed Japan to move south, that the United States could take a stronger stand in the Pacific. This conviction, shared by Stimson and others was a basic factor in the decisions made during the months before Pearl Harbor. By the end of August the Navy staff had worked out plans for seizing bases in the western Pacific, and had from Admiral Yamamoto a separate plan for an attack on Pearl Harbor. Table-top maneuvers at Tokyo Naval War College between 10-13 September resulted in agreement on operations for the seizure of the Philippines, Malaya, the Netherlands Indies, Burma, and islands in the South Pacific. But there was still some doubt about Yamamoto's plan. The exercise had demonstrated that a Pearl Harbor strike was practicable, but many felt that it was too risky, that the U.S. Pacific Fleet might not be in port on the day of the attack, and that the danger of discovery during the long voyage to Hawaii was too great. But Admiral Yamamoto refused to give up his plan and finally, when he failed to convert his colleagues, offered to resign from the Navy. The combination of his strong argument that the success of the southward drive depended on the destruction of the American fleet, his enormous prestige, and his threat to resign were too much for opponents of the plan. In mid-October, a month after the maneuvers, the Navy General Staff finally adopted his concept of a surprise carrier-based attack on Pearl Harbor and incorporated it into the larger plan for war.
By the fall of 1941 relations between the United States and Japan had reached a critical stage. American leaders had made it clear that so long as Japan adhered to the Tripartite Pact and to its efforts to conquer China there was little chance for compromise. But they needed time to complete their preparations.
For the Japanese, most of whom were unwilling to pay the American price for peace, time was of the essence. They were convinced that acceptance of American peace terms would only lead to further demands and ultimately leave Japan dependent on the United States and Great Britain. To them the gambles of war seemed preferable to the ignominy of a disgraceful peace. On 7th December 1941 the Japanese attacked the American Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor in the hope of knocking the United States out of a Pacific war. By doing so the Japanese hoped to be able to persue their strategic and imperialistic goals in the south. Japan's failure to achieve total victory meant that the japanese unified an isolationist nation against them, which then mobilised its mighty economy into a war machine that eventually defeated Japan.