Not-That-Bright
Andrew Quah
http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/05/02/1083436478926.html?from=storyrhs&oneclick=true'Wrongful life' lawsuit gives birth to a moral and legal dilemma
Doctors are being immunised against mistakes, writes David Hirsch.
Last week's 2-1 decision of the NSW Court of Appeal to reject the medical negligence claim of two severely disabled children is a backwards step in the fight for the rights of the disabled.
The two children, Alexia Harriton and Keeden Waller, will never be able to work and will need 24-hour care for the rest of their lives. They would not be in this situation were it not for the negligence of doctors - which has been admitted for the purposes of the legal argument.
But if it were not for the doctors' negligence the children would not "be" at all. And that is the problem.
In each case the doctors failed to diagnose conditions which, had the parents been told, would have resulted in a decision to terminate the pregnancy or not to conceive at all. In Alexia's case it was the failure to diagnose rubella early in her mother's pregnancy. In Keeden's case, his parents were genetically incompatible and he was affected by a foreseeable genetic defect.
At first blush these situations should not create difficult legal problems. The parents hire the doctors for advice because they are concerned not to have a child with severe disabilities. The advice is wrong and the children are born with severe disabilities. The doctors' negligence caused the very outcome they were hired to avoid. Why should the children not be entitled to compensation?
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In the Court of Appeal, Justice Keith Mason said the children should have a right to sue. Justices Jim Spigelman and David Ipp said they should not.
The majority said that what the disabled children were complaining about was "being born at all". This is because the only way of avoiding the disabilities was to avoid life altogether. It was their opinion that the law should not accept that "life" is a "damage" that can be sued for.
Mason said the claim was not about "being born" but about "life with disabilities" and the needs that were created by this condition.
These "wrongful life" claims have bedevilled courts all over the world. Historically, most courts have rejected them. But in recent years some courts in Europe, the US and elsewhere have accepted them. Mason supports that movement towards recognition of the rights of these disabled children.
A major reason Mason rejected the notion that "life" cannot be the subject of a legal claim is that it already is.
Last year the High Court determined that when a child is born following a negligent sterilisation procedure, parents can sue for losses arising from the birth - including in some cases the cost of raising the child until it is old enough to leave home. If the law recognises a claim by parents for the inconvenience and expense of a child born as a result of negligence, why would it not recognise a claim for a severely disabled child who has to live with the consequences of the very disability the doctor's skill was engaged to avoid?
In the "wrongful life" case the doctors argued in their defence that the claim offended principles of the "sanctity of life" They also insisted that their negligence did not cause the children's disabilities - nature did. Finally, they said that the children could not prove that they suffered any "damage" unless they could answer Shakespeare's conundrum of whether it is better "to be or not to be".
But when these admittedly engaging arguments about ethics, metaphysics and poetry are put to one side, one is left with the disturbing feeling that the Court of Appeal's decision is just another step towards immunising the medical profession against the consequences of its own mistakes.
Ipp, who advised the Commonwealth on how to reform tort law in the wake of the "insurance crisis", asked why judges should be extending the law of negligence when legislatures are restricting the right to sue.
Mason countered this by saying that just because governments, pressured by interest groups like the medical profession and the insurance industry, might restrict common law rights, this was no reason; in the absence of legislation preventing claims like these, judges had to "pause or go into reverse" in their job to do justice in a particular case. In saying this, Mason affirmed that the common law can and should respond, in a principled and humane way, to the challenges presented by modern medicine. His willingness to uphold the common law against the tide of politically motivated "tort reform" suggests that there is still some life in judge-made law. And there is nothing wrongful about that.
The practical effect of the Court of Appeal's decision to reject these "wrongful life" claims will mean that doctors will be able to shift the consequences of their negligence onto the taxpayer.
The High Court may get an opportunity to decide on whose side - that of the disabled child or the negligent doctor - justice lies.
David Hirsch is a partner at Maurice Blackburn Cashman Lawyers, who were the solicitors for Alexia Harriton.
This is simply insane....